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Abstract 
Since (Buss 1987), it has become clear that individuality is not to be considered as a given, 
but rather as something which needs to be explained. How has individuality emerged through 
evolution, and how has it subsequently been maintained? In particular, why is it that 
multicellular organisms appeared and persisted, despite the obvious interest of each cell of 
favoring its own replication? Several biologists see the immune system as one of the key 
components for explaining the maintenance of multicellular organisms’ individuality. Indeed, 
the immune system exerts a constant surveillance on all the constituents of the organism, 
including “cheaters” like tumor cells, which favor their own replication at the expense of the 
whole organism. In most cases, the immune system eliminates those cheaters. This is the 
“immune surveillance” hypothesis, first suggested by Burnet and Thomas (Burnet 1957; 
Thomas 1959; Burnet 1970). In this paper, I account for recent findings on immune 
surveillance in order to determine the precise role of the immune system in the emergence and 
maintenance of individuality. This investigation gives rise to a critical question for the domain 
of biological individuality: should immunity be considered as something unique to 
multicellular organisms? If it is indeed unique, should the multicellular organism be 
considered as an individual to a higher degree than any other living entity (genomes, cells, 
groups, etc.)? If it is not unique, what precisely are the equivalents of the immune system in 
other living individuals (again, genomes, cells, groups, etc.)? 
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1. Introduction: immunity and individuality 
It is crucial for biologists and philosophers alike to define what an individual is in the 
living world (Huxley 1912; Hull 1978, 1980, 1992; Buss 1987; Michod 1999; Santelices 
1999; J. Wilson 1999; R. Wilson 2007; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Clarke 2010). Biological 
individuality is certainly one of the hottest topics nowadays in philosophy of biology and 
theoretical biology, with both predominantly or exclusively evolutionary approaches 
(Godfrey-Smith 2009; Gardner and Grafen 2009; Queller and Strassmann 2009; Folse and 
Roughgarden 2010; Clarke forthcoming), and approaches mixing evolution with the study of 
physiological or “metabolic” processes  (Dupré and O’Malley 2009; Dupré 2010; Pradeu 
2010; Pradeu 2012). It seems likely that a convincing account of biological individuality will 
need to embrace domains as diverse as evolutionary biology, genetics, developmental 
biology, immunology, perhaps neurology, etc. 
Many biologists have insisted on the role of the immune system in the definition of 
biological individuality (Loeb 1930; Loeb 1945; Medawar 1957; Burnet 1960; Burnet 1969; 
Hamburger 1976; Buss 1987; Gould and Lloyd 1999; Michod 1999; Müller 2003; Cremer and 
Sixt 2009). Two main arguments are used to sustain this claim. The first argument pertains 
primarily to physiology, and seems rather intuitive – though I will show that it needs much 
clarification: the immune system, because it rejects some entities and accepts others, plays an 
important role in establishing the boundaries of the organism (Medawar 1957; Burnet 1969; 
Hamburger 1976; Gould and Lloyd 1999; Müller 2003; Cremer and Sixt 2009). The second 
argument pertains rather to evolutionary biology: it says that the immune system is one of the 
main “policing” mechanisms in living individuals, that is, one of the main mechanisms by 
which a high-level individual (typically, a multicellular organism) prevents the emergence of 
variants having a different fitness at a lower-level (typically, at the level of individual cells) 
(Michod 1999; Frank 1995, 1996, 2007; Rolff 2007). 
In this paper I show the decisive role of the immune system in the emergence and  
maintenance of biological individuality. I demonstrate that the two arguments above are valid, 
but need to be made much more precise and be based on better evidence than has been done 
so far. I suggest immunity is central to defining what an organism is, to account for the unity 
of the organism despite the heterogeneity of its constituents (many of which are genetically 
“foreign”), to clarify the distinction between an organism and a biological individual, and 
finally to shed light on some evolutionary transitions. 
A conceptual issue of crucial importance arises immediately. When some biologists 
talk about the “individual”, they mean a multicellular organism (important examples include 
Lewontin 1970 and Buss 1987: viii). In sharp contrast, in the subsequent literature on units of 
selection understood as interactors (in particular Hull 1980; for a review, see Lloyd 2007), 
and then on evolutionary hierarchies and major transitions (Maynard-Smith and Szathmary 
1995; Michod 1999; Okasha 2006; Godfrey-Smith 2009), an “individual” is an evolutionary 
individual, that is, an entity upon which natural selection acts as a whole. Within this 
framework, an “individual” may therefore refer to different levels in a biological hierarchy 
that comprises biological entities as different as genes, gene networks, genomes, organelles, 
cells, organisms, groups, etc. I endorse this view, and consider that the category “biological 
individual” is more inclusive than the category “organism” (see preliminary definitions 
below). But then a problem arises: I said that one of my claims was that immunity is crucial to 
understanding biological individuality, but it is not clear whether immunity can play a role at 
all these different levels of biological individuality. Is there any role for the immune system in 
defining the individuality of, say, a cell or a group? My strategy in this paper will be to focus 
on the role of the immune system in the definition of the multicellular organism’s 
individuality, and then to raise the issue of the possible extension of this question to other 
biological entities, including unicellular organisms, individual cells in multicellular 
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organisms, and “social organisms” such as some social insects. In the course of my argument, 
I will make clear why I do not endorse the now widespread view that “organism” is not a 
scientifically pertinent category (Dawkins 1982; Dupré and O’Malley 2009; Bouchard 2010, 
Bouchard this volume; Haber, this volume; for a defense of the organism concept, see Pepper 
and Herron 2008) 
A related issue is to determine which organisms have an immune system. I will show 
that every organism does – vertebrates, invertebrates, plants, and even unicellulars. 
Much confusion in the literature arises from the fact that no definition of the notions 
of individual and organism are given. As preliminary definitions, let me say that an individual 
in general is an entity that can be designated through a demonstrative reference (this F), is 
separable, countable, has acceptably clear-cut spatial boundaries, and exhibits transtemporal 
identity, that is, the capacity to remain the “same” while changing through time. A biological 
individual is a living thing that fulfils these requirements. An organism is a functionally 
integrated living thing, highly organized, and made of interdependent parts. This later 
definition is admittedly vague (I will try to make it more precise), but we can easily see that, 
according to the definitions just given, a gene or an organelle, for instance, might be defined 
as biological individuals without being organisms. Other definitions could perhaps be 
adopted, but these are, I think, general enough to accommodate different views currently held 
about biological individuality. 
In this paper, my aim is to show the fruitfulness of including immunity in the 
definition of biological individuality. I do this mainly through a close demonstration of the 
two claims above, that is, first the role of the immune system in establishing biological 
boundaries, and second the “self-policing” activity of the immune system. My strategy will be 
as follows. Section 2 shows the role of the immune system in establishing the boundaries of a 
biological individual. Section 3 makes clear why taking immunity into account sheds light on 
the individuation of every multicellular organism. In section 4, I demonstrate that the recent 
revival of the “immune surveillance” hypothesis proves the validity of the claim (made, in 
particular, by Michod 1999) that the immune system is key in maintaining individuality at the 
level of the multicellular organism. Section 5 shows that the immune system was also 
certainly involved in the evolutionary emergence of individuality at the level of the 
multicellular organism. In section 6 I argue that every organism is heterogeneous, that is made 
of genetically different entities, and hence that the immune system controls not only 
genetically “self” constituents, but rather all the normal constituents of the organism, be they 
endogenous or exogenous (e.g., commensal and symbiotic bacteria). Finally, section 7 raises 
the issue of the possible extension of my conclusions from the case of the multicellular 
organism to other levels in the hierarchy of living individuals. 
 
2. The immune system and the establishment of the boundaries of the individual 
Many biologists and philosophers consider that the immune system plays a critical 
role in the definition of biological individuality because the immune system is pivotal to 
establishing the organism’s boundaries. The key argument here is that the immune system 
offers a principle of inclusion (Pradeu 2010; Pradeu 2012), because it establishes what is 
rejected and what is not rejected by an organism. In so doing, the immune system determines 
which constituents stick together and thus are parts of one and the same organism. In addition 
to this exclusion-inclusion mechanism, the immune system is truly “systemic” in the sense 
that, contrary to many biological “systems” (respiratory, digestive, etc.) it exerts its activity 
everywhere in the organism, insuring the unity and the cohesiveness of the organism as a 
whole. 
The general idea is put very clearly by Gould and Lloyd (1999), who say that the 
immune system plays a decisive role in the establishment of the spatial boundaries of 
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organisms: “organisms are coherently bounded in space and kept recognizable in form by a 
physical skin that separates the self from the outside world, a distinction often buttressed by 
various devices— an immune system as the most prominent example—that can recognize and 
disarm or eliminate transgressors into the interior space”. The same idea is expressed by 
Müller (2003), who, working on sponges, considers that an immune system is a prerequisite 
for biological individuality. 
As the quotation from Gould and Lloyd (1999) suggests, the immunological self-
nonself theory is certainly the best known framework used to explain how the immune system 
establishes the organism’s boundaries. According to this theory (Burnet 1962; Burnet 1969), 
every foreign (“nonself”) entity triggers an immune response, while no constituent of the 
organism (“self” constituent) triggers an immune response (except, of course, in pathological 
cases). Thus, the immune system is said to maintain the integrity of the organism via the 
recognition and rejection of every exogenous entity (as analyzed and criticized in Tauber 
1994). 
The self-nonself framework has been criticized from different perspectives, and 
several competing theories have been put forward (Pradeu 2012). Nevertheless, the common 
point between these different and competing approaches is that they all consider that the 
immune system is key to defining the boundaries of the organism. 
 Two problems arise with this account of biological individuality based on the action of 
the immune system. First, about the target of this account: it seems that the immune system 
says something about the organism, but not about every biological individual in general (a 
gene or a gene network, for instance, do not seem to have an immune system). In addition, it 
is often said that only higher vertebrates have an immune system; if this is true, then doesn’t it 
make the immune system irrelevant for defining the individuality of the great majority of 
organisms living on Earth? I address this problem in section 3. Second, the immune system 
appears to shed light on one aspect of biological individuality, namely physiological unity and 
cohesiveness, but it is not yet clear whether the immune system can contribute to a better 
understanding of evolutionary individuality. Surely, physiological individuality and 
evolutionary individuality are related, but how exactly? In particular, is it possible to attribute 
a precise role to the immune system in evolutionary transitions, that is, in the emergence of a 
new evolutionary unit? These questions are addressed in sections 4 and 5.  
 
3. Immunity and organisms 
 The preliminary definitions above have shown that the concept of a biological 
individual is larger than that of an organism. Therefore, one possible objection to the account 
given here is that it is too restrictive, as it addresses only the question of organismic 
individuality. For the moment, I accept this objection. I will show the fruitfulness of an 
immunological analysis of the organism’s individuality, before asking what the contribution 
of immunology to a more general analysis of biological individuality may be (section 7 
below). 
 Let us now deal with another, even more pressing, objection: isn’t it well-known that 
only a small, even negligible, proportion of organisms have an immune system? Admittedly, 
higher vertebrates possess an immune system, but certainly invertebrates and plants do not? 
Here I show that this view – long held among immunologists – is now known to be utterly 
wrong. One of the main revolutions of current immunology is the redefinition of its scope 
(Pradeu 2009). Because of an almost exclusive focus on lymphocytes, immunologists have 
long considered that only Gnathostomata (i.e. jawed vertebrates) had a true immune system. 
But in fact, in all multicellular organisms in which investigations have been made, an immune 
system has been found, in the sense of a system of biochemically specific interactions leading 
to the rejection of some living entities. Here, by “organisms” I mean phenomenal organisms, 
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that is, organisms as we perceive them and conceive them (later in this paper, I suggest a 
scientific definition of the organism, distinct from the phenomenal one). The fact that all 
multicellular organisms have an immune system should not be surprising, as they must all 
cope with pathogens – e.g. bacteria, viruses, helminthes, fungi. Well-studied examples 
include insects, in particular the Drosophila (Lemaître and Hoffmann 2007), and plants 
(DeYoung and Innes 2006). A majority of organisms have what is called “innate” immunity 
(Janeway and Medzhitov 2002), as opposed to “adaptive” immunity, where a second 
encounter with one pathogen gives rise to a stronger and more rapid immune response. 
Nonetheless, the boundary between innate and adaptive immunity is difficult to establish 
(Vivier and Malissen 2005; Lanier and Sun 2009), and several forms of quicker and stronger 
response in the case of a second challenge with a pathogen have been documented (e.g. Kurtz 
and Franz 2003). In fact, even unicellulars have an immune system, a topic to which I shall 
return at the end of this text. Suffice to say for the moment that immunology does indeed deal 
with organisms, but its domain is extremely extensive nonetheless, as it includes all 
multicellular organisms, and possibly all organisms. 
 With this important precision in mind, we can now go back to the question raised 
above: the immune system seems to be useful in order to define the physiological 
individuality of present day organisms, but can it contribute in addition to a precise definition 
of evolutionary individuality? This question is crucial because the debate over biological 
individuality in the last decades has been framed mainly in evolutionary terms. In what 
follows, I show that immunity plays a decisive role in the definition of evolutionary 
individuality. Several biologists, especially Steven Frank (1996, 2002, 2007) and Richard 
Michod (1999) have suggested that the immune system is important in understanding the 
evolutionary transition from cells to multicellular organisms. Here I try to follow in their 
footsteps by analyzing the exact role of the immune system in this transition, and then to 
extend their framework, by asking whether the immune system helps us to understand other 
evolutionary transitions. 
 
4. The immune system and the maintenance of evolutionary individuality  
An evolutionary individual is an entity upon which natural selection acts as a whole 
(Hull 1980; 1992). On the basis of this definition, many biologists and philosophers have 
defended a hierarchical conception of evolutionary individuality, in which genes, gene 
networks, genomes, organelles, cells, organisms, groups, etc. may all, under proper 
circumstances, be considered as biological individuals (Hull 1980, 1992; Gould and Lloyd 
1999; Gould 2002). A more stringent criterion, stemming from the literature on evolutionary 
transitions, says that evolutionary individuals must form lineages characterized by heritability 
of fitness (Michod 1999; Godfrey-Smith 2009). 
 A founding work was the book by Leo Buss, The Evolution of Individuality (Buss 
1987). Buss shows that individuality is not a given, but something that has emerged in the 
course of evolution and was subsequently maintained. The crucial problem is the following: 
how, in the course of evolution, are higher level individuals constituted through the grouping 
of lower level individuals, and how is this new evolutionary individual subsequently 
maintained? In Michod’s terms, why “lower-level units relinquish their claim to fitness, as it 
were, so that fitness may emerge at the new higher level” (Michod 1999: 6)? Michod says that 
the multicellular organism’s harmony and integrity could be threatened by selection among 
cells, below the level of the organism (Michod 1999: 64). Therefore, some mechanisms 
probably make this threat unlikely, or less likely.  
Following Buss and Michod’s reasoning, two individualizing mechanisms can be 
suggested in order to explain the emergence and maintenance of a new, higher level of 
evolutionary individuality. The first mechanism consists in the prevention of the emergence 
 6 
of fitness conflicts at a lower level (it is an “ex ante” mechanism), by increasing the genetic 
homogeneity of the individual. In the case of the multicellular organism, the idea is that 
genetically homogenous cells will cooperate better than genetically heterogeneous ones (Buss 
1987; Maynard-Smith and Szathmary 1995; Michod 1999: 108). The separation between 
germ cells and somatic cells is generally considered to be a mechanism of this type: somatic 
cells have no evolutionary interest in favoring their own fitness, as they are evolutionary dead 
ends (Godfrey-Smith 2009). 
The second mechanism consists in the elimination of new variants favoring their own 
fitness (it is an “ex post” mechanism). This mechanism is often called “policing”. The term 
“policing” may seem vague, and perhaps anthropomorphic, as this view is often formulated 
with expressions like “cooperation” (which is a larger concept than that of “policing”), 
“prevention against cheaters”, etc. Yet the general argument can be straightforwardly put, by 
saying that a policing mechanism is one by which a biological entity eliminates lower level 
variants which favor their own fitness at the expense of the fitness of the whole organism 
(Frank 1995; Michod 1999). 
The general idea behind these two individuating mechanisms (prevention of conflicts 
and policing of conflicts) is that the emergence of a new level of individuality always 
presupposes the partial repression of Darwinian processes (reproduction, heritability, 
differential fitness) at lower levels, what Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009) has vividly labeled “de-
Darwinization”. I will now focus on policing mechanisms, and I will say a few words about 
the germ-soma separation (a prevention mechanism) below. 
 The clearest example of evolution of individuality is certainly that of the multicellular 
organism – the exclusive focus of Buss (1987) and the main focus of Michod (1999, 2005, 
2007; Michod and Roze 2001). Why do cells in our bodies not replicate and increase their 
own fitness, even at the expense of the whole organism? Why do “cheaters” – that is, cells 
increasing their own fitness – not spread and disrupt the organism? According to Buss and 
Michod, several “policing” mechanisms eliminate new variants that may favor their own 
fitness. In the case of cancer cells, however, these mechanisms dysfunction, and we can 
observe that individual cells replicate and increase their fitness, indeed at the expense of the 
whole organism. Michod envisions two main policing mechanisms at the organism’s level: 
the immune system and apoptosis (Michod 1999: 119). I will now analyze the role of the 
immune system, before going back to apoptosis. 
In what sense can the immune system be described as a “policing” mechanism? The 
general idea is that the immune system constantly watches the constituents of the organism 
and exerts a control over intra-individual conflicts (Michod 1999: 119, 131-132). In 
particular, in many cases, the immune system detects tumors and eliminates them. I think 
Michod’s hypothesis is very important and true, but unfortunately he gives few experimental 
arguments in support of it. Using recent literature in immunology, I would like now to explain 
why the research on “immune surveillance” shows that Michod is right when he says that the 
immune system is a policing mechanism. 
The “immune surveillance” hypothesis was put forward by Burnet and by Thomas at 
the end of the 1950s (Burnet 1957; Thomas 1959). Burnet then gave a detailed account of this 
hypothesis in 1970 (Burnet 1970), where Burnet insists on the inspiring role of Thomas 
(Burnet 1970: 19). In the 1950s, it was undoubtedly a bold hypothesis, focusing on the 
evolution of the immune system. According to this hypothesis, the adaptive immune system 
has been selected through evolution for its capacity to constantly control the constituents of 
the organism and eliminate tumors. The hypothesis has three main aspects: i) tumors may 
arise constantly through the accumulation of genetic mutations, which lead to aberrant 
antigenic determinants at the surface of tumor cells; ii) the organism’s lymphocytes can 
recognize these antigenic determinants and, in most cases, trigger the elimination of the 
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tumor; iii) this capacity of the adaptive immune system to localize, recognize and destroy 
tumors is the main selective force which led to its emergence. Here is a telling illustration of 
Burnet’s view in 1970: “There is no doubt whatever that once a cell line has emerged into 
malignancy, some type of general control has been abrogated, new anomalies in the genome 
arise freely including chromosomal changes and there is free scope for selection of variants of 
greater proliferative power” (Burnet 1970: 159); but, he adds, immunological surveillance 
usually acts before these changes, and normally prevents them from occurring (Burnet 1970: 
160). 
It may seem surprising that Burnet, the main artisan of the self-nonself theory (Burnet 
1969), suggested a theory which depicts the immune system as rather “self-centered”, that is, 
selected by evolution for its capacity to deal with “internal” entities, in this case tumors. Yet it 
should be kept in mind that Burnet considered tumors as “modified self”, and therefore as a 
particular form of “foreign” antigens, that is, of “nonself” (Burnet 1970: 152). 
The evidence in favor of the immune surveillance hypothesis was scarce. In the 1970s, 
several experiments, in particular those of Osias Stutman (Stutman 1974) tended to suggest 
that the immune surveillance hypothesis was wrong. In 1978, the hypothesis was considered 
dead (Dunn et al. 2002). But, after an eclipse of more than fifteen years, this hypothesis made 
a striking comeback, mainly through the demonstration of the role of interferon gamma (IFN-
γ) and of recombination activating genes (RAG) in preventing the development of tumors. As 
with many other subjects, Burnet (together with Thomas) had a remarkably adequate 
intuition, though the demonstration of the immune surveillance hypothesis took many years – 
as, in fact, predicted by Burnet himself (Burnet 1970: 176-177). 
Since the 2000s, the immune surveillance hypothesis has gained even stronger 
experimental support (Dunn et al. 2002; Pardoll 2003; Kupper and Fuhlbrigge 2004; Dunn, 
Koebel  and Schreiber 2006; Koebel et al. 2007; Guerra et al. 2008; Cramer and Finn 2011; 
Fridman et al. 2011). Tumor cells trigger specific immune responses which, in a majority of 
cases, lead to their elimination. The components of the immune system involved in this 
elimination include, in particular, natural killer (NK) cells, T cells, interferon γ, macrophages, 
dendritic cells. Some have suggested the concept  of “cancer immunoediting” as an extension 
of the concept of “immune surveillance”: according to this concept, the immune system both 
eliminates the majority of tumors, and selects tumor variants that are better suited to survive 
in an immunologically intact environment – as it does when it selects bacterial or viral 
variants (Dunn et al. 2002). 
Thus, immune surveillance exists, and is a critical activity of the immune system. It is 
not clear whether the elimination of tumors is the main evolutionary force that has shaped the 
immune system, as stated by Burnet and Thomas, but one can say at least that elimination of 
tumors is an important aspect of what an immune system does. In addition, and contrary to 
what has long been said, it seems unlikely that only vertebrates can develop cancers, as shown 
by recent work on Drosophila (Janic 2010) and other invertebrates (Robert 2010). More 
experimental data is needed on this subject, but it seems reasonable to suppose both that, in 
every multicellular organism, tumors may arise, and there exist some “policing” mechanisms 
which prevent the development of such tumors. My conclusion on this question is that 
immune surveillance as it is understood nowadays is exactly what was needed to anchor 
Michod’s intuitions and models in convincing experimental data: these data show that the 
immune system plays a decisive role in the maintaining of individuality, preventing the 
emergence of conflicts of fitness at a lower level. 
 As we saw, Michod also envisions apoptosis as a policing mechanism. Apoptosis is 
physiological cell death (sometimes called “programmed cell death”, or “cell suicide”), 
induced in defective, damaged or dangerous cells in the body (Kerr, Wyllie, Currie 1972; 
Wyllie, Kerr, Currie 1980; Vaux and Strasser 1996). Apoptosis helps to eliminate abnormal 
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cells, and in particular tumor cells (Lowe, Cepero, Evan 2004). For different reasons, 
apoptosis can be seen not as another policing mechanism, but as one aspect of immune 
policing. Indeed, the key process of the elimination of apoptotic cells is accomplished by 
phagocytic cells, in particular macrophages, which are major components of the immune 
system (Jeannin, Jaillon and Delneste 2008; Elliott et al 2009). In addition, in several cases 
apoptosis is induced by immune cells, which have been activated by their interaction with the 
abnormal cells. This is true in particular of natural killer (NK) cells (Screpanti et al 2005; 
Vivier et al 2009). In any case, within the immune surveillance framework, it seems 
legitimate to include apoptosis in the general mechanism of policing of the body’s cells by the 
immune system. And naturally, if adopted, this view further strengthens the claim that the 
immune system is key in maintaining individuality. 
 In addition, Michod sees policing mechanisms as only one set of mechanisms enabling 
a transition in individuality, along with germ-soma separation. Buss (1987) also insists on this 
aspect. He suggests that the sequestration of the germ line occurs only in a small fraction of 
the living world, but that it is precisely this fraction in which true biological individuals can 
be found. 
 My own view is that the role of germ-soma separation in biological individuality is 
much exaggerated. In a majority of organisms, in particular plants and colonial animals, this 
separation does not hold (Buss 1987; Clarke 2010, forthcoming). In contrast, the double 
immunological criterion (the establishment of boundaries thanks to the activity of the immune 
system, and the “policing” activity) does apply to plants and colonial organisms (Pradeu 
2010). So immunity is a much stronger and more general criterion than other criteria, such as 
the germ-soma separation or the passage through a bottleneck, which are in fact rather rare 
(Clarke forthcoming). Because immunity plays this double role, and because it is widespread 
in so many different organisms, I suggest immunity is the most important mechanism to 
explain the evolution of the multicellular organism’s individuality (as Peter Godfrey-Smith 
suggested to me, this view is close to that held by Müller 2003, though the arguments used to 
reach this conclusion are different) 
In conclusion, the immune system is very important for maintaining evolutionary 
individuality in organisms, and this is true across phyla.  
 
5. The immune system and the emergence of evolutionary individuality 
 Even though the immune system plays an important role in the maintenance of 
biological individuality, it is not clear whether it is involved in the emergence of individuality. 
In other words, immunity might have evolved as a late mechanism, strengthening the 
individuality of the multicellular organism, but not involved in its appearance in the first 
place. On the contrary, I suggest here that the immune system was probably critically 
involved in the emergence of the multicellular organism as a new biological individual. 
 Slime molds offer a model of the transition from unicellular to multicellular life. The 
social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum adopts a double life: most of the time, it is 
unicellular, but when food becomes scarce, as many as 100 000 cells gather and constitute a 
multicellular entity called a slug (Leslie 2007). This slug can then move to a different 
location, where D. discoideum generally returns to a unicellular mode of life. This social 
amoeba has fascinated many researchers both in the past (see Kessin 2001 for a review) and 
recently (Strassmann, Zhu and Queller 2000; Kessin 2001; Gregor et al. 2010; see also 
Bonner 2009 for a recent review). In an outstanding paper published in Science in 2007, it 
was shown that the social D. discoideum possesses an immune system (Chen, Zhuchenko and 
Kuspa 2007). Even though social amoebae feed on bacteria, they can also be infected by 
bacteria, including by its main pathogen Legionella pneumophila. Chen and colleagues show 
that a subset of D. discoideum cells, called “sentinel” cells, are specialized immune cells, 
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which eliminate toxins and destroy bacterial pathogens. The sentinel cells circulate within the 
slug, and stick to pathogens when they meet them. The interaction is made via TirA, a TIR 
(Toll/interleukin-1 receptor) domain protein (TIR are typically involved in immune 
recognition, among other functions, both in plants and animals; O’Neill and Bowie 2007). 
These sentinel cells function to a large extent like neutrophils and macrophages in vertebrates. 
Importantly, S cells appear to be present in five other species of Dictyostelia, probably 
constituting a general characteristic of the social amoeba. 
The discovery of Chen and colleagues strongly suggests that the development of 
specialized immune cells is a necessary preliminary step for the constitution of a multicellular 
organism. This early specialization seems essential to the transition to multicellularity. From 
an evolutionary point of view, it suggests that cells specialized in immune functions were 
present at the earliest steps of the transition from unicellular to multicellular life (Leslie 
2007). It is not as surprising as it may appear at first sight, for an aggregation of cells with no 
immune system would certainly be prone to immediate disruption, both because of pathogens 
and of the appearance within the aggregate of some cells replicating and favoring their own 
fitness at the expense of the whole. An immune system that patrols the body and eliminates 
abnormal constituents seems indispensable for the construction and maintenance of the 
organism’s cohesiveness. 
 The inference from observations on present social amoebae to the evolutionary 
transition from unicellularity to multicellularity is not straight-forward. Yet gathering data on 
organisms which oscillate between a unicellular and a multicellular way of life is overall the 
most appropriate way to make progress in the understanding of this evolutionary transition 
(Kirk 2005; Michod 2005; Leslie 2007). More work is certainly needed on other model 
organisms to better understand this transition, including the well-studied volvocine green 
algae (Kirk 2005; Michod 2005; Prochnik et al. 2010). But my intuition is that research to 
come will confirm the view presented here: an immune system eliminating abnormal 
components is strictly necessary for a collection of cells to become a unified and cohesive 
multicellular individual, or “organism.” 
 The experimental and theoretical arguments offered here add to the analysis of 
Michod. In particular, as we saw, recent work on immune surveillance shows that Michod is 
right, and even that his conclusions can be radicalized by saying that the immune system 
plays a decisive role in the emergence and maintenance of individuality at the organism’s 
level. I would like now to say more about the characterization of this cohesive multicellular 
organism. One of its main features is that it is not a genetically homogenous entity, and 
correlatively the criterion for immune elimination of abnormal constituents is not genetic 
homogeneity.  
 
6. Policing a heterogeneous organism 
Within the literature on evolutionary transitions, genetic homogeneity is seen as a 
crucial feature of a biological individual by a great majority of authors (Buss 1987; Maynard-
Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Michod 1999; Strassmann and Queller 2007). The general idea is 
that genetically homogeneous constituents will cooperate better than heterogeneous 
constituents, because they share a “common fate” (Dawkins 1976; Buss 1987; Maynard-
Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Michod 1999; Godfrey-Smith 2009). In particular, Maynard-
Smith and Szathmáry (1995) hold that the close kinship among cells explain their 
collaboration and the emergence of a new biological individual. 
In fact, though, genetic homogeneity is not found in a great majority of organisms, 
both in plants and animals (Buss 1987; for a detailed analysis of individuality in plants, see 
Clarke forthcoming). More generally, it is not a necessary condition for the definition of an 
evolutionary individual (Michod 1999; Strassmann and Queller 2004; Godfrey-Smith 2009;  
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Queller and Strassmann 2009). Many have suggested that true biological individuals, or best 
individualized entities, are those in which genetic homogeneity is found (Buss 1987). Yet I 
think this view must be rejected, because every multicellular organism is heterogeneous, that 
is, made of genetically different entities (Pradeu 2010). In particular, every multicellular 
organism (plant, invertebrate, vertebrate) hosts hundreds of billions of commensal and 
symbiotic bacteria (for example, it is estimated that the gut of a mammal hosts 1012 
microorganisms; Garrett, Gordon and Glimcher 2010). Due to the massive presence of 
symbionts, every multicellular organism is a chimera. Many symbiotic bacteria play useful, 
even indispensable, roles in the body, in particular as far as digestion, immunity and 
development are concerned (Pradeu 2010, 2011). They are not simply present in the 
organism, but key functional constituents of it (O’Hara and Shanahan 2006; Garrett, Gordon 
and Glimcher 2010; Pradeu 2010). In addition, they are not confined to a few isolated parts of 
the organism; instead they are massively present in all the interfaces of the organism, which 
basically means almost everywhere in the organism (McFall-Ngai 2002; McFall-Ngai, 
Henderson and Ruby 2005). Moreover, they are not “invisible” to the organism, and in 
particular to the immune system, but on the contrary are in continuous interactions with it 
(Garrett, Gordon and Glimcher 2010). Finally, symbiotic bacteria often play a decisive 
evolutionary role, because they make a difference to the host’s fitness and can be transmitted 
to the next generation (Pradeu 2010). I suggest that genetic homogeneity is not at all a 
criterion for biological individuality. 
So every cohesive, functional organism is heterogeneous. Hence, immune surveillance 
exists, but precisely the immune system exerts its surveillance on the heterogeneous 
constituents of the body. It interacts constantly with the organism’s normal constituents, be 
they genetically “self” constituents or symbiotic bacteria. Symbiotic bacteria are part of what 
immune surveillance targets: many bacteria must be seen as true constituents of the organism, 
that must be controlled by the immune system, exactly as “endogenous” constituents (Frank 
1996). Normal bacteria are tolerated, but bacterial variants that proliferate abnormally in the 
organism are destroyed by the immune system (Eberl 2010). 
Thus, what triggers an immune response of rejection is not genetic foreignness, but the 
expression of strongly unusual molecular patterns. This is the core assertion of the “continuity 
theory” (Pradeu and Carosella 2006a, 2006b; Pradeu 2012), according to which what triggers 
an immune response is the appearance of molecular patterns that are strongly different from 
those with which the immune system has interacted up to now, be they endogenous (as in the 
case of tumor cells, which are genetically self cells but which do trigger immune responses) 
or exogenous (as in the case of pathogenic bacteria, parasites, viruses, etc.) 
The continuity theory constitutes an extension of the immune surveillance hypothesis 
of Burnet and Thomas (Pradeu 2012). The immune system constantly watches the organism’s 
components, and responds against unusual (aberrant) proliferation of its constituents, 
whatever the origin of these constituents may be (a close meaning is given to the phrase 
“immune surveillance” by Ricklin et al. 2010). Incidentally, because the surveillance is 
exerted towards both endogenous and exogenous entities, a better, less anthropomorphic term 
for “policing” (suggested by Michod 1999 and now widely used) could be “elimination of 
uncontrolled reproducing living constituents”. 
 To sum up our conclusions so far, a multicellular organism is made of heterogeneous 
constituents, some of them present from conception or birth, while others appear in the 
organism throughout its life (by “endogenous” or “exogenous” modifications, as in the case of 
newly integrated commensals or symbionts), to which a unity, a cohesiveness, must be given. 
Thus, a multicellular organism is characterized by the continuous construction of a 
cohesiveness through the permanent control of present constituents by the immune system. 
Immunity is key to insure the unity and cohesiveness of the organism. In my view, traditional 
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evolutionary individuation needs to be complemented by an immunity-based individuation, 
because of the crucial role of the immune system in insuring the unity of different biological 
constituents (Pradeu 2010, 2012). I suggest to call biological individuals that are cohesively 
organized through an immune system “organisms”. In this view, “organisms” are indeed 
special biological individuals, because they are individualized to a higher degree than other 
biological individuals. It is not that organisms as we see them (“phenomenal” organisms) are 
necessarily special, but that there are special things in the living world that we decide to call 
“organisms” (those which are cohesively organized through an immune system). 
 I will now end this paper by a discussion of an important question that I have up to 
now left aside: can immunology be useful to better understand biological individuals other 
than multicellular organisms? In other words, is the analysis of immunity relevant only for 
multicellular organisms, or is it also relevant beyond that case? 
 
7. Immune individuality beyond the level of the organism 
In this paper, I have talked mainly, indeed almost exclusively, about multicellular 
organisms. But if an organism is a biological individual that possesses an immune system, 
then the category of “organism” may be broader than expected initially. I will take here two 
important examples: first unicellulars, and second “superorganisms”. 
Contrary to what has been thought for many years, prokaryotic unicellulars appear to 
have an immune system. Because bacteria and archaea are constantly exposed to the threat of 
viruses (bacteriophages), it is not surprising that they possess some mechanisms to interact 
with them and eliminate them, but until recently the nature of these mechanisms remained 
unknown. In 2006, it was hypothesized that CRISPR-Cas is a system of adaptive immunity 
that integrates short genomic segments of selfish elements (viruses or plasmids) into specific 
loci in prokaryotic genomes and then employs these inserts to abrogate the replication of the 
cognate agents via a RNAinterference-like mechanism (Makarova et al. 2006; see also 
Makarova, Aravind, Wolf, Koonin 2011). In simpler terms, the suggestion was that bacteria 
and archaea possess an immune system which is based on a mechanism close to RNA 
interference. Major empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis was found in 2007 
(Barrangou et al. 2007). In a recent paper, Horvath and Barrangou (2010) explain that 
CRISPR is in fact not mechanistically analogous to eukaryotic RNA-interference, but is 
definitely an interference-based adaptive immune system. It is an immune system because it 
makes possible the specific recognition of viral sequences, and the elimination of the viruses; 
in addition, it can be called “adaptive,” because a second encounter with the same virus leads 
to a quicker and stronger response. In addition, this protection can be transmitted to offspring. 
According to Horvath and Barrangou (2010), the CRISPR-cas system is massively present in 
Archaea (90%) and probably less present in bacteria (40%). There is now a growing 
consensus on the idea that the CRISPR-cas system must be seen as an adaptive immune 
system of microorganisms (van der oost et al. 2009; Garneau et al. 2010; Horvath and 
Barrangou 2010; Makarova, Haft et al. 2011). 
Thus, it appears that unicellulars are biological individuals whose cohesiveness 
presupposes the constant action of an immune system. According to the view defended in the 
previous sections, it means that they are true “organisms”. If this is correct, it means that the 
reflection offered above about the emergence and maintenance of individuality in 
multicellular organisms through the activity of an immune system needs in fact to be raised at 
the level of the much more ancient transition from independent replicators to the first 
prokaryotic cell. Because this transition is not very well known, and because basically nothing 
is known of the possible role of the immune system in this transition, I will leave this 
discussion for now, pending more experimental evidence in the near future. I think, though, 
that it raises the fascinating hypothesis that immunity has been a key element in both the 
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evolutionary transition to multicellularity and the very ancient evolutionary transition to the 
first cell – often conceived of as the first “true” biological individual (Michod 1999; Godfrey-
Smith 2009). It also suggests that each cell in multicellular organisms like us may have its 
own immune system. RNA silencing has been convincingly described as the “genome’s 
immune system” (Plasterk 2002). Within this perspective, one can conceive a hierarchy of 
immunological individuals, or “organisms”: a multicellular living thing like us is an organism 
in so far as it possesses an immune system, and in addition it comprises billions of cells, 
which themselves are organisms in so far as they each possess their own immune system. It is 
an attractive hypothesis, though it probably needs to be complemented by an analysis of the 
way in which the whole organism regulates immune responses at the level of each cell. 
A second important question concerns so-called “superorganisms”. A superorganism 
is a collection of organisms that can itself be described as an organism or a quasi-organism, 
because of some particular features, generally functional integration, cohesiveness and/or 
division of labor (EO Wilson 1971; Wilson and Sober 1989; Strassmann and Queller 2007; 
Hölldobler and Wilson 2008; Gardner and Graffen 2009) The most significant example is 
social insects, like some bees, termites and ants. Some authors even suggest to simply call the 
collective entities characterized by high cooperation and low conflict “organisms”, arguing 
that “organismality” is only a question of degree, and that these collective entities possess a 
very high degree of organismality (Queller and Strassmann 2009). Because I have suggested 
that having an immune system is crucial for the cohesiveness of a biological individual, and 
even is indispensable to being an “organism”, the question that must be raised now is the 
following: do the highly integrated collective entities often described as “superorganisms” 
possess an immune system?  
 Insects, and in particular social insects, have immune systems. In a majority of cases, 
the immune response in social insects occurs at the level of the individual insect. Yet colony-
level immunity may exist as well in some species (Cremer, Armitage and Schmid-Hempel 
2007; Cremer and Sixt 2009). Indeed, in some cases, it appears that being part of a colony 
makes an important difference in the capacity to mount an immune response. In the termite Z. 
angusticollis, Traniello et al. (2002) recorded a significantly higher survivorship among 
nymphs that developed immunity as members of a group in comparison to isolated nymphs. 
Some bees have guards that control the nest’s entrance and attack or exclude infected 
nestmates. It seems to be a case of colony-level immunity, and it is in those cases that it 
appears legitimate to talk about a true “social immunity” (Cremer, Armitage and Schmid-
Hempel 2007). More research is needed on these forms of immunity in the many different 
“social” organisms. But it seems likely that, in some cases, the immune system of the colony  
will make it strongly cohesive, in such a way that the colony will qualify as an “organism”. 
Additionally, these cases could shed light on the transition to multicellularity, and on 
evolutionary transitions more generally. 
Again, more work is needed in this fascinating area. My only aim in this section has 
been to suggest that immunity may be decisive to understand not only the transition to the 
multicellular organism, but also the transition to the first prokaryotic unicellulars, and that to 
some “superorganisms”. 
 
Conclusion 
 Immunity plays a crucial role in defining biological individuality at the level of the 
multicellular organism, both because it delineates its boundaries (physiological individuation) 
and, through its “surveillance” activity, it has been indispensable in the emergence and 
maintenance of its cohesiveness (evolutionary individuation). The immune system is not the 
only feature that individualizes biological entities, but it individualizes them to an extremely 
high degree, since it constantly interacts with present constituents and rejects every abnormal 
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component. Because of this essential role in insuring the unity and cohesiveness of a living 
thing, I suggest to call immunologically individualized biological entities “organisms”. In my 
view, the role of immunity in the construction of biological individuality through evolution 
has been underestimated. I hope that this paper brings interesting data and arguments to fill in 
this gap. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Ellen Clarke, Peter Godfrey-Smith and Richard E. Michod for 
discussions on biological individuality. 
 
References 
Barrangou R et al. (2007) CRISPR provides acquired resistance against viruses in 
prokaryotes. Science 315: 1709-1712. 
Bonner JT (2009) The Social amoebae: the biology of cellular slime molds. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Bouchard F (2010) Symbiosis, Lateral Function Transfer and the (many) saplings of life. 
Biology and Philosophy (4): 623-641. 
Burnet FM (1957) Cancer – a biological approach. Brit Med J 1: 841-847. 
Burnet FM (1960) Immunological recognition of self. Nobel Lectures in Physiology or 
Medicine 3: 689-701. 
Burnet FM (1969) Cellular immunology: Self and notself. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Burnet FM (1970) Immunological surveillance. Oxford: Pergamon. 
Buss L (1987) The evolution of individuality. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Chen G, Zhuchenko O, Kuspa A (2007) Immune-like phagocyte activity in the social amoeba. 
Science 317: 678-681.  
Clarke E. (2010) The problem of biological individuality. Biological Theory 5(4): 312–325. 
Clarke E. (forthcoming) Plant Individuality: A Solution to the Demographer’s Dilemma. 
Cramer DW, Finn OJ (2011) Epidemiologic perspective on immune-surveillance in cancer. 
Current Opinion in Immunology 23: 265-271. 
Cremer S, Armitage SAO, Schmid-Hempel P (2007) Social immunity. Current Biology 17: 
R693–R702. 
Cremer S, Sixt M (2009) Analogies in the evolution of individual and social immunity. Phil. 
Trans. R. Soc. B 364, 129-142. 
Dawkins R (1976) The Selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
DeYoung BJ, Innes RW (2006) Plant NBS-LRR proteins in pathogen sensing and host 
defense. Nature Immunology 7: 1243-1249. 
Dunn GP, Bruce AT, Ikeda H, Old LJ, Schreiber RD (2002) Cancer immunoediting: from 
immunosurveillance to tumor escape. Nature Immunology 3(11), 991-998. 
Dunn GP, Koebel CM, Schreiber RD (2006) Interferons, immunity and cancer 
immunoediting. Nature Reviews Immunology 6: 836-848. 
Dupré J (2010) The polygenomic organism. Sociological Review 58 (s1): 19–31.  
Dupré J, O’Malley M (2009) Varieties of living things: life at the intersection of lineage and 
metabolism. Philosophy and Theory in Biology 1 (online). 
Eberl G (2010) A new vision of immunity: Homeostasis of the superorganism. Mucosal 
Immunology 3(5): 450–460. 
Elliott MR et al (2009) Nucleotides released by apoptotic cells act as a find-me signal to 
promote phagocytic clearance. Nature 461: 282-287. 
Folse 3rd HJ, Roughgarden J (2010) What is an individual organism? A multilevel selection 
perspective. The Quarterly review of biology 85 (4): 447.  
 14 
Frank SA (1995) George Price’s contributions to evolutionary genetics. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology 175: 373-388. 
Frank SA (1996) Host control of symbiont transmission: the separation of symbionts into 
germ and soma. The American Naturalist 148(6): 1113-1124. 
Frank SA (2002) Immunology and evolution of infectious disease. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Frank SA (2007) Dynamics of cancer: incidence, inheritance and evolution. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Fridman WH et al. (2011) Immunosurveillance in human non-viral cancers. Current Opinion 
in Immunology 23: 272-278. 
Gardner A, Grafen A (2009) Capturing the superorganism: a formal theory of group 
adaptation.  Journal of Evolutionary Biology 22 (4): 659–671.  
Garneau SE et al. (2010) The CRISPR/Cas bacterial immune system cleaves bacteriophage 
and plasmid DNA. Nature 468: 67-72. 
Garrett WS, Gordon JI, Glimcher LH (2010) Homeostasis and inflammation in the intestine. 
Cell 140(6): 859–870. 
Godfrey-Smith P (2009) Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gould SJ, Lloyd E (1999) Individuality and adaptation across levels of selection: How shall 
we name and generalize the unit of Darwinism? Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences USA 96(21): 11904-11909. 
Gregor T, Fujimoto K, Masaki N, Sawai S (2010) The onset of collective behavior in social 
amoebae. Science 328: 1021-1025. 
Guerra et al 2008. NKG2D-Deficient Mice Are Defective in Tumor Surveillance in Models of 
Spontaneous Malignancy. Immunity 28: 571–580. 
Hamburger J (1978 [1976]) Discovering the individual. New York: Norton & Company. 
Hölldobler B, Wilson EO (2008) The superorganism: the beauty, elegance, and strangeness of 
insect societies. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. 
Horvath P, Barrangou R (2010) CRISPR/Cas, the immune system of bacteria and archaea. 
Science 327: 167-170. 
Hull D (1978) A Matter of Individuality. Philosophy of Science 45: 335-360.  
Hull D (1980) Individuality and selection. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 11: 
311-332. 
Hull D (1992) “Individual”, in Keller E.F. & Lloyd E. (eds.), Keywords in Evolutionary 
Biology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Janeway CA, Medzhitov R (2002) Innate immune recognition. Annual Review of 
Immunology 20: 197-216. 
Janic A et al. (2010) Ectopic Expression of Germline Genes Drives Malignant Brain Tumor 
Growth in Drosophila, Science 330: 1824-1827. 
Jeannin P, Jaillon S, Delneste Y (2008) Pattern recognition receptors in the immune response 
against dying cells. Current opinion in immunology 20: 530-537. 
Kerr JFR, Wyllie AH, Currie AR (1972) Apoptosis: a basic biological phenomenon with 
wide-ranging implications in tissue kinetics. Br. J. Cancer 26: 239–57 
Kessin RH (2001) Dictyostelium: evolution, cell biology, and the development of 
multicellularity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kirk DL (2005) A twelve-step program for evolving multicellularity and a division of labor. 
BioEssays 27: 299–310. 
Koebel CM et al. (2007) Adaptive immunity maintains occult cancer in an equilibrium state, 
Nature 450: 903-907. 
 15 
Kupper TS, Fuhlbrigge RC (2004) Immune surveillance in the skin: mechanisms and clinical 
consequences. Nature Reviews Immunology 4: 211-222. 
Kurtz J, Franz K (2003) Evidence for memory in invertebrate immunity. Nature 425: 37-38. 
Lanier L, Sun J (2009) Do the terms innate and adaptive immunity create conceptual barriers? 
Nature Reviews Immunology 9: 302-303. 
Lemaitre B, Hoffmann J (2007) The Host defense of Drosophila melanogaster. Annual 
Review of Immunology 25: 697-743. 
Leslie M (2007) A slimy start for immunity? Science 317: 584. 
Lewontin R (1970) The units of selection. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 1: 1- 
18. 
Lloyd EA (2007) Units and levels of selection, in The Cambridge companion to the 
philosophy of biology, ed. D.L. Hull and M. Ruse, 44-65. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Loeb L (1930) Transplantation and individuality. Physiological Review 10: 547-616. 
Loeb L (1945) The biological basis of individuality. Springfield: Thomas. 
Lowe SW, Cepero E, Evan G (2004) Intrinsic tumour suppression. Nature 432: 307-315. 
McFall-Ngai M (2002) Unseen forces: The influence of bacteria on animal development. 
Developmental Biology 242: 1–14. 
McFall-Ngai M, Henderson B, Ruby EG, eds. (2005) The Influence of Cooperative Bacteria 
on Animal Host Biology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Makarova KS et al. (2006) A putative RNA-interference-based immune system in 
prokaryotes: Computational analysis of the predicted enzymatic machinery, functional 
analogies with eukaryotic RNAi, and hypothetical mechanisms of action. Biology Direct 1(7). 
Makarova KS, Aravind L, Wolf YI, Koonin EV (2011) Unification of Cas protein families 
and a simple scenario for the origin and evolution of CRISPR-Cas systems. Biology Direct 6: 
38. 
Makarova KS, Haft DH, Barrangou R, Brouns SJJ, Charpentier E, Horvath P, Moineau S, 
Mojica FJM, Wolf YI, Yakunin AF, van der Oost J, Koonin EV (2011) Evolution and 
classification of the CRISPR–Cas systems. Nature Reviews Microbiology 9: 467-477. 
Maynard-Smith J, Szathmáry E (1995) The Major Transitions in Evolution. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Medawar PB (1957) The uniqueness of the individual. London: Methuen. 
Michod RE (1999) Darwinian dynamics: evolutionary transitions in fitness and individuality, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Michod RE (2005) On the transfer of fitness from the cell to the multicellular organism. 
Biology and Philosophy 20: 967-987. 
Michod RE (2007) Evolution of individuality during the transition from unicellular to 
multicellular life. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 104(1): 8613–8618. 
Michod R, Roze D (2001) Cooperation and conflict in the evolution of multicellularity. 
Heredity 86: 1-7. 
O’Hara AM, Shanahan F (2006) The gut flora as a forgotten organ. EMBO Reports 7(7): 
688–693. 
O’Neill LAJ, Bowie AG (2007) The family of five: TIR-domain-containing adaptors in Toll-
like receptor signalling. Nature Reviews Immunology 7: 353-364. 
Okasha S (2006) Evolution and the levels of selection. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Pepper JW, Herron MD (2008) Does biology need an organism concept? Biol. Rev. 83: 621–
627. 
Plasterk RH (2002) RNA silencing: the genome’s immune system. Science 296: 1263-1265. 
Pradeu T (2009) Immune system: ‘Big Bang’ in question. Science 325(5939): 393. 
 16 
Pradeu T (2010) What is an organism? An immunological answer. History and Philosophy of 
the Life Sciences 32: 247-268. 
Pradeu T (2011) A mixed self: the role of symbiosis in development. Biological Theory 6(1). 
Pradeu (2012) The Limits of the self: Immunology and biological identity. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Pradeu T, Carosella ED (2006a) The self model and the definition of biological identity in 
immunology. Biology and Philosophy 21: 235-252. 
Pradeu T, Carosella ED (2006b) On the definition of a criterion of immunogenicity. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 103(47): 17858-17861. 
Prochnik SE et al (2010) Genomic Analysis of Organismal Complexity in the Multicellular 
Green Alga Volvox carteri. Science 329: 223-226. 
Queller DC, Strassmann JE (2009) Beyond society: the evolution of organismality. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 364 (1533): 3143.  
Ricklin D, Hajishengallis G, Yang K, Lambris JD. 2010. Complement: a key system for 
immune surveillance and homeostasis. Nature Immunology 11(9): 785-797. 
Robert J (2010), Comparative study of tumorigenesis and tumor immunity in invertebrates 
and nonmammalian vertebrates. Developmental and Comparative Immunology 34: 915–925. 
Rolff 2007. Why did the acquired immune system of vertebrates evolve? Developmental and 
Comparative Immunology 31 (2007) 476–482 
Santelices B (1999) How many kinds of individual are there? Trends in Ecology & Evolution 
14 (4): 152–155. 
Screpanti V, Wallin RPA, Grandien A, Ljunggren HG (2005) Impact of FASL-induced 
apoptosis in the elimination of tumor cells by NK cells. Molecular Immunology 42: 495-499. 
Strassmann JE, Queller DC (2004) Genetic conflicts and intercellular heterogeneity. Journal 
of Evolutionary Biology 17: 1189-1191. 
Strassmann JE, Queller DC (2007) Insect societies as divided organisms: the complexities of 
purpose and crosspurpose. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 104, 8619–
8626. 
Strassmann JE, Zhu Y, Queller DC (2000) Altruism and social cheating in the social amoeba, 
Dictyostelium discoideum. Nature 408: 965–967. 
Stutman O (1974) Tumor development after 3-methylcholanthrene in immunologically 
deficient athymic-nude mice. Science 183: 534-536. 
Tauber AI (1994) The Immune self: theory or metaphor? Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Thomas L. (1959) Discussion in Cellular and Humoral Aspects of the Hypersensitive States, 
ed. H.S. Lawrence, New York: Hoeber-Harper, 529-532. 
Traniello JFA, Rosengaus, RB, Savoie K (2002) The development of immunity in a social 
insect: evidence for the group facilitation of disease resistance. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences USA 99: 6838-6842. 
van der Oost J. et al. (2009) CRISPR-based adaptive and heritable immunity in prokaryotes. 
Trends in Biochemical Sciences 34(8): 401-407. 
Vaux DL, Strasser A (1996) The molecular biology of apoptosis. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 
93: 2239–44 
Vivier E, Malissen B (2005) Innate and adaptive immunity: Specificities and signaling 
hierarchies revisited. Nature Immunology 6(1): 17-21. 
Vivier E et al (2009) Innate or Adaptive Immunity? The Example of Natural Killer Cells. 
Science 331: 44-49. 
Wilson DS, Sober E (1989) Reviving the superorganism. Journal of Theoretical Biology 136: 
337-356. 
 17 
Wilson EO (1971) The Insect Societies. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University  Press. 
Wilson J (1999) Biological individuality: the identity and persistence of living entities. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wilson R (2007) The biological notion of individual, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(online). 
Wyllie AH, Kerr JFR, Currie AR (1980) Cell death: the significance of apoptosis. Int. Rev. 
Cytol. 68:251–306. 
